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Abstract 
This paper investigates the equilibrium exchange rates of three Southeastern European countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania), of two CIS economies (Russia and Ukraine) and of Turkey. A 
systematic approach in terms of different time horizons at which the equilibrium exchange rate is 
assessed is conducted, combined with a careful analysis of country-specific factors. For Russia, a 
first look is taken at the Dutch Disease phenomenon as a possible driving force behind 
equilibrium exchange rates. A unified framework including productivity and net foreign assets 
completed with a set control variables such as openness, public debt and public expenditures is 
used to compute total real misalignment bands. 
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1. Introduction 
The ambition of this paper is to look at equilibrium exchange rates of three Southeastern 
European countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, of two CIS economies, namely 
Russia and Ukraine, and of Turkey. The choice of these countries may appear surprising at the 
first sight. But it is not. The prospect of joining the EU and the actual accession of eight 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union in May 2004 have crowded 
out attention from equilibrium exchange rates of the rest of the former soviet block. This paper 
makes a, hopefully not futile, attempt to cover countries of the former soviet block so-badly 
treated in the literature, for which data are readily available to conduct a more than narrative 
country-by-country analysis. They are Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. 
Bulgaria, Romania, and probably Croatia will join the EU in the foreseeable future, and 
questions related to entering ERM-II and adoption the euro for the new EU member states will 
pop up soon. But perhaps more important is this question, which also apply to Russia and 
Ukraine: Do these countries have their exchange rates “right” and are they not misaligned after 
having implemented reform measures with diverging speed and success to turn their economies 
to a market economy? The reason for Turkey being involved in this investigation is the accession 
negotiations opening in October 2005 with this country, and in this context, the equilibrium 
exchange rate of Turkey may not be confined solely to the Turkish central bank and the IMF any 
more but may be of interest also for European policy makers in the future. 
Although a considerable number of the papers on this topic deal with these countries in a panel 
context such as Halpern and Wyplosz (1997, 2001), Krajnyák and Zettelmeyer (1998), Begg et 
al. (1999), DeBroeck and Sløk (2001), Dobrinsky (2003) and Fischer (2004), only very few 
studies focus on the countries in Southeastern Europe and the CIS individually. Chobanov and 
Sorsa (2004) analyze Bulgaria and Stapafora and Stavlev (2003), Sosunov and Zamulin (2004), 
and Rautava (2004) study the case of Russia. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2004) apply the monetary 
model to Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Russia. For Turkey, Doroodian et al. (2002 and Atasoy 
and Saxena (2004) investigate the equilibrium real exchange rate. Civcir (2004) and Crespo-
Cuaresma et al. (2004) analyze the monetary model for Turkey. 
This paper offers to fill this gap. We propose a systematic approach in terms of different time 
horizons at which the equilibrium exchange rate is assessed. First, we take a look at the deviation 
from absolute PPP. Subsequently, we investigate whether the real exchange rates in levels   2
correspond to the underlying productivity levels. In a next step, factors behind real exchange rate 
movements are studied. First, the simple Balassa-Samuelson effect and the Dutch Disease are put 
under the microscope and are then incorporated in a more unified framework, namely the stock-
flow approach, which also includes other channels explaining real exchange rate developments. 
Both time series and panel data are used to study deviations from the equilibrium exchange rate. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describe the theoretical 
underpinnings. Section 3 deals with data and econometric issues. Section 4 provides some 
stylized facts regarding the real exchange rate of the countries under study, followed by Section 
5 with the estimation results. Section 6 finally presents some concluding remarks.   3
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. The Real Exchange Rate in Level 
In this paper, we follow a bottom-up approach in that we start looking at approaches to the 
equilibrium exchange rate which are assumed to hold in the long run and then move forward 
systematically toward shorter time horizons. 
Let us now begin with the concept of purchasing power parity (PPP), which can be thought of as 
a very long-term approach for countries in the catching-up process. It is a well-understood fact 
that purchasing power parity is a poor tool, even in the long run, for measuring equilibrium 
exchange rates for transitional and developing countries because these countries’ currencies are 
undervalued in terms of PPP. According to PPP, the exchange rate given by the ratio of domestic 
and foreign absolute price levels should be equal to the nominal exchange rate which can be 
observed on the foreign exchange market. In other words, the real exchange rate, which is given 
as  P / * EP *) P / P /( E = , should equal 1. With the exchange rate being defined as domestic 
currency units expressed in terms of one unit of foreign currency,
2 a real exchange rate higher 
than one implies undervaluation.  
Nonetheless, it has been long recognized that PPP is misguiding for transition economies. This is 
when the Balassa-Samuelson argument comes into the picture, which says that the less 
developed country is usually less productive in producing tradable goods. The price level in the 
open sector is given by the PPP condition. At the same time, the level of productivity in the open 
sector, usually lower in the less developed country, determines the price level in the closed sector 
through intersectoral wage linkages. Hence, the price level in the sheltered sector, and 
subsequently the overall price level, will be below that prevailing in the more developed country. 
As a result, the observed nominal exchange rate in the open sector appears to be weaker (higher) 
than the exchange rate given by PPP. 
This undervaluation in PPP terms is an equilibrium undervaluation if it reflects a difference 
between productivity levels. By contrast, it may be the case that the price level does not fully 
reflect productivity levels. If prices are higher than what productivity levels would predict, the 
exchange rate can be viewed as overvalued in terms of productivity levels (although still 
undervalued in PPP terms). If prices are lower than what productivity levels would predict, the   4
currency can be though of as undervalued (not only in PPP terms). This is depicted in Figure 1 
hereafter. 
Figure 1. Trend Appreciation of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate 
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Source: Égert, Halpern and MacDonald (2004) 
 
2.2. The Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rate 
The equilibrium undervaluation in PPP terms is corrected with the catching-up process going on, 
if it is associated with a trend appreciation of the real exchange rate. Égert et al. (2004a) argue 
that such an appreciation may have three sources in transition economies: (1) the Balassa-
Samuelson effect in dynamics (market-based services), (2) the appreciation of the real exchange 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 In the rest of the paper, an increase (decrease) in the (real) exchange rate implies a depreciation (appreciation). 
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rate of the open sector, and (3) a trend increase of regulated prices. Such an appreciation can be 
viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon and is demonstrated in Figure when moving from point A 
to point D. Of course, initial undervaluation can also explain large real exchange rate 
appreciation, merely reflecting adjustment to equilibrium. 
Let us now review quickly these channels. According to the relative version of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, an increase in productivity of the open sector exceeding that in the closed 
sector (dual productivity henceforth) may go in tandem with increases in real wages in the open 
sector without any loss in competitiveness given that relative PPP holds in the open sector 
( P P E / * ⋅  is stable over time). Assuming wage equalization between the open and the market-
based sheltered sectors, prices in the closed sector will increase. This productivity-driven 
inflation in market-based nontradables then results in higher overall inflation and a positive 
inflation differential, which in turn causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. Recent empirical 
results indicate, however, that at best half of the real appreciation is accounted for by the B-S 
effect in transition economies. 
A large part of non-tradables is either administered or regulated. Non-market non-tradables 
behave markedly differently than market non-tradables for two reasons. The relative price of 
non-market services relative to other goods in the economy was much lower at the outset of 
transition than in a typical market economy at the same level of development would have been. 
Prices of non-market non-tradables, mainly transportation, telecommunication and public 
utilities (water, electricity and gas) were left unchanged or their increase were considerable lower 
than the rest of the consumer basket at the beginning of price liberalization. But because these 
sectors are very capital intensive, capital maintenance costs and then the replacement of the 
capital stock at market prices were to be included in prices, which may generate much larger 
price changes and this in the longer run, than for any other sectors. MacDonald and Wójcik 
(2004) and Égert and Lommatzsch (2004) studied the effects of regulated prices. On the basis of 
4 CEECs, MacDonald and Wójcik (2004) found that regulated price developments dominated 
even productivity induced price movements. By contrast, Égert and Lommatzsch (2004) found 
that although increases in regulated prices play an important role in the real appreciation of some 
transition economies, they did not fade out the effect of productivity increases.   6
Finally, turning to the third channel of trend real appreciation, it has to be stressed that even the 
level of tradable prices of the transition economies is still lower than on average in the old EU 
member states. Correspondingly, price level convergence and real appreciation is not only linked 
to non-tradables but also to the prices of tradables. With economic restructuring, transition 
economies are able to increase their capacity to produce goods of better quality. First of all, old 
goods disappeared from the goods basket whereas new ones, with better quality, entered it. At 
the same time, better marketing and the resulting shift in consumer preferences towards goods 
produced in the domestic economy made it possible to market better and at higher prices the 
domestic goods. All this leads to an increase in tradable prices, too, the subsequent consequence 
of which is a trend appreciation of the tradable price-deflated real exchange rate. Égert and 
Lommatzsch (2004) develop a formal model that describes this phenomenon. This non-price 
competitiveness effect can be best captured with productivity in industry that reflects a huge 
increase in quality improvements triggered by large FDI inflows. An empirical implication of 
this is that an increase in productivity in the open sector is associated with an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate of the open sector (tradable goods). This is in contrast with what the class of 
New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) models suggests. NOEM models such as 
developed in Beningo and Thoenissen (2003), MacDonald and Ricci (2002) or Világi (2004) 
predict that although an increase in the open sector’s productivity will lead to a B-S induced 
appreciation of the internal real exchange rate, such productivity improvements would cause 
tradable prices to decrease leading to a depreciation of the open sector’s real exchange rate. 
Besides the three aforementioned channels of real exchange rate appreciation, countries rich in 
natural resources and especially the ones with economic structures relying heavily on oil 
production and exports are usually good candidates for the Dutch Disease (D-D) phenomenon.  
According to the D-D phenomenon, an increase in the price of the exported commodity on the 
world markets encourages more investment in the given sector, which in turn increases sectoral 
output. The need for more labor to produce more output in the commodity sector causes wages to 
increase, which, if wages tend to equalize across sectors, leads to an increase in wages in other 
sectors of the economy. As a result, the competitiveness of the non-oil open sector drops, 
implying a slowdown in exports and, as a consequence, in overall sectoral output. At the same 
time, because of wage increases, the relative price of nontradables and the production of this 
sector rise. Another implication of increasing commodity prices is the appreciation of the real   7
exchange rate triggered by the inflow of export revenues. Simultaneously, the overall trade 
balance remains balanced or even in surplus. The symptoms of the Dutch Disease can be 
summarized in the following propositions: 
1.  The real exchange rate appreciates; 
2.  The output and exports of the non-oil (nonbooming) open sector decline; 
3.  The production of the nontradable sector increases; and 
4.  The trade balance is not in the red. 
In the flagship paper of the proponents of the D-D phenomenon, Sachs and Werner (1995) find 
strong empirical evidence in favor of the D-D effect especially in emerging Asian economies and 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1990s, an increasing number of 
papers put into question the general validity of the D-D phenomenon and showed that it holds 
under specific conditions, thus diminishing the policy implication of the findings of Sachs and 
Warner (1995), according to which countries with abundant natural resources should not exploit 
their natural resources because this puts at risk their long-term growth. Spilimbergo (1999), for 
instance, shows that the D-D phenomenon does not seem to work for the cases of Chile and 
South Africa, countries with abundant natural resources. Gylfason (2002) argues that abundant 
natural resources may lead to sluggish long-term growth because of (1) ill-defined property 
rights, imperfect or missing markets and lax legal structures in many developing countries and 
emerging market economies; (2) the fight for resource rents and the concentration of economic 
and political power hampering democracy and growth, and (3) too many people getting stuck in 
low-skill-intensive, natural-resource-based industries. Kronenberg (2004) argues that one of the 
main reasons for the D-D phenomenon in transition economies is corruption. Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004) suggest that, when controlling for e.g. corruption, investment, openness and 
education, abundant natural resources do not decrease (as predicted by the D-D phenomenon) but 
foster economic growth in the long run. 
2.3. A Unified Framework for Modeling Real Exchange Rates 
In this section, the different channels of real exchange rate dynamics are incorporated into a 
more general framework, namely the stock-flow approach to the real exchange rate, which has 
been used recently for industrialized countries (Faruqee, 1995; Aglietta et al.; 1998; and Alberola   8
et al., 2002) as well as for transition economies (Alberola, 2003; Rahn, 2003; Burgess et al., 
2004; and Égert et al. 2004b), according to which the real exchange rate based on the CPI (
CPI Q ) 
can be linked to the dual productivity differential (PROD) and to net foreign assets (NFA). The 
reduced-form equation commonly used is the following: 
  ) NFA , PROD ( f Q
/ /
CPI
− + − +
=         ( 1 )  
In general, the sign on the productivity variable is not straightforward. NOEM models predict 
that an increase in productivity in the open sector leads to a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate of the open sector (positive sign). However, the overall impact depends also on whether this 
effect is counterbalanced by the traditional B-S effect. A specificity of transition economies is 
the productivity variable of the open sector can also reflect nonprice competitiveness in the open 
sector and thus lead to a real appreciation as argued in Égert et al. (2004b). 
The sign on net foreign assets is not unambiguous either. Égert et al. (2004b) put forth that for 
well-established economies, an increase in the net foreign assets position is usually associated 
with an appreciation of the real exchange rate because of capital inflows related to increasing 
payments received on net foreign assets (positive sign). However, in transition economies, 
domestic savings may be insufficient to finance the high growth potential. Thus, foreign savings 
are needed, the inflows of which reduce (increase) net foreign assets (net foreign liabilities) and 
cause the real exchange rate to appreciate. This implies a negative sign. However, there is a 
threshold for the net foreign assets position beyond which the sign is likely to switch because the 
domestic economy has to start servicing its foreign liabilities. Any additional increase in net 
foreign liabilities would lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The mechanism causing the real exchange rate to appreciate in case the D-D phenomenon takes 
effect can be associated with increasing revenues from oil exports. Therefore, for Russia, 
equation (1) is augmented with the corresponding variable, which is given as the product of the 
price of Ural crude oil and crude oil production volume (
−
⋅ =
OIL OIL oduction Pr P OIL _ REV ): 
) _ , , (
/ / − − + − +
= OIL REV NFA PROD f Q
CPI        ( 1 a )  
To check for the robustness of our results, we include a set of control variables. Bergstrand 
(1991) argues that an increase in the relative price of nontradables may also be caused by   9
demand-side pressures leading to a real appreciation. Private and public consumption as a share 
of GDP have been widely used in the literature to account for these demand-side factors.
3 
Because of data availability, we only use public expenditures as a share of GDP (EXP). 
Openness (OPEN ) is also often included in empirical estimations. If openness were to reflect 
trade liberalization, an increase in openness should lead to a deterioration of the current account 
position. This is usually assumed to lead to a real depreciation. MacDonald (1998) and Clark and 
MacDonald (1999) use government debt (PDEBT ) to approximate the risk premium. An 
increase in government debt implies higher risk, and this causes the real exchange rate to 
depreciate. MacDonald (1998) also includes real oil prices (ROIL), which is to reflect changes 
in the terms of trade. For non-oil producing countries, a rise in real oil prices implies a worsening 
of the terms of trade, which calls for a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Equations (1b) to 
(1e) show equation (1) augmented with the control variables: 
) , , (
/ / − − + − +
= EXP NFA PROD f Q
CPI        ( 1 b )  
) , , (
/ / + − + − +
= OPEN NFA PROD f Q
CPI        ( 1 c )  
) , , (
/ / + − + − +
= PDEBT NFA PROD f Q
CPI        ( 1 d )  
) , , (
/ / + − + − +
= ROIL NFA PROD f Q
CPI        ( 1 e )  
For Russia, the equations tested are equations (1a) – (1e) augmented with the variable 
−
⋅
OIL OIL oduction Pr P . Equations (1) to (1e) are also estimated using PPI-based real effective 
exchange rates. 
3. Data and Econometric Issues 
Average labor productivity in industry, based on industrial production, is used for the 
productivity variable. Net foreign assets are approximated with cumulated monthly current 
account balances relative to GDP.
4 Openness is obtained as the average of exports and imports of 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Avallone and Lahrèche-Révil (1999), Beguna (2002), Bitans (2002), Coricelli and Jazbec (2004), Dobrinsky 
(2003), Fischer (2004), Halpern and Wyplosz (1997), Kim and Korhonen (2002) and MacDonald and Wójcik (2004) for 
transition economies. 
4 For Russia, official current account figures do not reflect the flight of capital from the country and hence may overstate net 
foreign assets.   10
goods relative to GDP. Similarly to MacDonald (1998), government debt is proxied by 
cumulated monthly deficits of the central or the consolidated general government. Government 
expenditures as a share of GDP are obtained as the share of expenditures of the central or the 
consolidated general government in GDP. For more details on data sources, see appendix 2.
5 
Finally, it should be noted that dummy variables are included for Bulgaria to capture the 
financial crisis in 1997 and for Russia and Ukraine covering 1998 to capture the Russian crisis. 
For Turkey, two dummies are employed. The first is meant to capture the Mexican crisis in 1994, 
and the second intends to control for the effect of the Russian, Brazilian and Turkish crises in 
1998, 1999 and 2001, respectively. A cautionary note should be made about the quality of the 
data, which in some cases may be of real concern. For want of anything better, we go ahead with 
these data, and interpret the result with corresponding cautiousness. 
Equations (1)-(1e) are estimated based on both time series and panel cointegration techniques. 
For time series, the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) of Stock and Watson (1993) and the 
auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) of Pesaran et al. (2001) are used. DOLS incorporates 
lags and leads of the regressors in first differences and thus accounts for the endogeneity of the 
regressors and for the serial correlation in the residuals: 
t j t , i
n
i
k
k j
j , i t , i
n
i
i t X X Y ε γ β β + ∆ + + = −
=− = = ∑∑ ∑
1 1
0
2
1
        (2) 
where k1 and k2 denote, respectively, leads and lags. The presence of cointegration is assessed 
upon stationarity of the residuals  t ε obtained from the long-term relationship, in the vein of the 
Engle-Granger approach by testing for unit roots in the residuals of the long-run relationship 
derived using DOLS as in equation (3). The critical values derived by MacKinnon(1991) for this 
purpose are used:
6 
                                                 
5 Data from national sources is preferred except if longer time series were available from the OECD or the IMF databases. The 
time span differs in function of the data availability of the different time series. The longest possible time span is always used. 
6 For the unit root tests, the lag length is determined using the Schwarz information criterion.   11
t t , i
n
i
i t X Y ε β β + + = ∑
=1
0           (3) 
The ARDL approach uses the error correction form of the ARDL model is given by equation (4); 
where the dependent variable in first differences is regressed on the lagged values of the 
dependent and independent variables in levels and first differences.  
t j t , i
n
i
l
j
j , i
l
j
j t j t , i
n
i
i t t X Y ) X Y ( Y ε γ η β ρ β + ∆ + ∆ + + + = ∆ −
== =
− −
=
− ∑∑ ∑ ∑
10 1
1
1
1 0
2 1
  (4) 
The lag structure of both the DOLS and the ARDL are determined primarily on the basis of the 
Schwarz information criterion with the maximum lag length being 4, but the Akaike and 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria are also employed complementarily. 
To detect the presence of cointegrating relationships, Pesaran et al. (2001) employ the so-called 
bounds testing approach. Using conventional F-tests, the null of  0 ... : 1 0 = = = = n H β β ρ  is 
tested against the alternative hypothesis of  0 ,..., 0 , 0 : 1 1 ≠ ≠ ≠ n H β β ρ . Pesaran et al. (2001) 
tabulate two sets of critical values, one for the case when all variables are I(1), i.e. upper bound 
critical values and another one when all variables are I(0), i.e. lower bound critical values. 
Critical values are provided for five different models, of which model (3) with unrestricted 
intercept and no trend will be used in our study. If the test statistic is higher than the upper bound 
critical value, the null of no cointegration is rejected in favour of the presence of cointegration. 
On the other hand, an F-statistic lower than the lower bound critical value implies the absence of 
cointegration. In the event that the calculated F-statistic lies between the two critical values, there 
is no clear indication of the absence or existence of a cointegrating relationship.  
Because of possible heterogeneity across the countries, we employ the mean group DOLS, 
FMOLS and ARDL estimators that are able to account for cross-country heterogeneity in the 
slope coefficients in a panel context. A negative and statistically significant error correction term 
for the mean group ARDL is interpreted as evidence for cointegration. 
4. Stylized Facts 
Figure 2 indicates an undervaluation of the real exchange rate in level vis-à-vis the euro for all 
countries under study. The largest undervaluation has been found in Ukraine, whereas the   12
Croatian currency appears to be the least undervalued one among the countries. There are 
evident signs of a decrease in undervaluation for Bulgaria, Romania and perhaps for Russia. By 
contrast, the undervaluation appears pretty stable for Croatia and Turkey, and it fluctuates 
strongly for Ukraine.
7 
Figure 2 Deviation from Absolute Purchasing Power Parity vis-à-vis the Euro 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations based on data obtained from the WIIW’s annual database. The data for Turkey were obtained from 
NewCronos/Eurostat. 
Note: The charts are obtained as EP*/P, where E is the actual nominal exchange rate, and P and P* are the absolute domestic and 
foreign price levels. 
 
We now set out to analyze whether the exchange rate of the countries under consideration were 
undervalued or overvalued in terms of productivity levels. Put in another way, we are interested 
in whether a given country is at point A, A’ or A’’ in Figure 1. This is an important issue because 
if there is initial undervaluation or overvaluation, both the estimated long-term coefficients and 
the constant term obtained from the time series and in-sample panel estimates may be biased and 
thus would also bias the derived real misalignment (see Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004).  
Such an analysis is best conducted using cross-sectional data.
8 We make use of five regressions 
reported in Čihák and Holub (2003), Coudert and Couharde (2003) and Maeso-Fernandez et al. 
(2004). The fitted values of the real exchange rates in level (relative price levels or the exchange 
rate gap) of the countries under study obtained from these equations are then compared to the 
actual real exchange rates for each country against the EU-15. 
                                                 
7 For Russia and Ukraine, some of the fluctuations may be due to changes in the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
8 In such a framework, the real exchange rate in levels (the relative price level or the exchange rate gap) of the home country vis-
à-vis a benchmark economy (the reciprocal of the real exchange rate in levels) is regressed on the relative productivity level of 
the home country to that in the foreign benchmark. In practice, however, GDP per capita or GDP per employment expressed in 
PPP terms, a broad proxy for productivity, is employed because of data (un)availability. 
1
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8
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Table 3 Cross-Sectional Regressions, Against the EU-15 
   Countries  1 β   Year 
Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004)  25 (OECD)  0.50  2002 
Coudert and Couharde (2003)  120 developing 
economies  0.25 2000 
Čihák and Holub (2003)  30 EU+CEEC  0.90  1999 
Čihák and Holub (2003)  22 EU+CEEC  0.86  2000 
Čihák and Holub (2003)  30 EU+CEEC  0.94  1999 
Notes: The coefficient is the slope coefficient from the regression.  PROD Q
level
1 0 β β + = ; R2 stands for the goodness-of-fit 
of the regression. MFOS regress the log level of the exchange rate gap on the log level of relative GDP per capita, whereas CH 
regress relative price levels on relative per capita GDP levels (to the EU-15). 
 
The three papers offer an interesting combination of country coverage. Coudert and Couharde 
(2003) include 120 developing and emerging economies, whose GDP per capita expressed using 
the purchasing power standard did not exceed the corresponding figure of the euro area. The 
sample also included all transition economies with a few exceptions. By contrast, the sample 
used in Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004) is composed of 25 industrialized OECD countries, 
excluding all transition economies.
9 Čihák and Holub (2003) use a number of EU-15 countries 
and transition economies together. 
These observations have interesting implications. First, the regression based on a large number 
of developing and emerging countries can be viewed as reflecting how the real exchange rate and 
per capita GDP may be linked, on average, for emerging and developing economies. Second, 
using a narrow sample of industrialized countries offers some perspectives regarding what this 
relationship looks like for higher GDP per capita levels. For the countries under study, such a 
relationship could be thought of as applying in the longer run (because the developing and 
emerging economies are expected to catch up with the industrialized economies in the long run). 
Third, taking a group of European transition and developed EU economies may tackle some 
heterogeneity problems in Coudert and Couharde (2003) and, at the same time, is able to 
anticipate long-term behavior given by the regression results in Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004). 
However, the problem of initial undervaluation can potentially undermine cross-sectional 
regression if the dataset on which they are based contains countries with initially undervalued 
currencies. This is clearly the case of the Čihák and Holub regressions, and of the Coudert and 
Couharde regression, though to a lesser extent because the transition countries do not dominate 
any more. 
                                                 
9 The panel includes the EU-15 (except for Luxembourg), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.S.A. , Norway, Iceland, Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey. OECD countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are excluded.   14
Figure 4 reports under- and overvaluations in terms of productivity levels for the period of 1991–
2003.
10 Focusing on the Maeso-Fernandez et al. and the Coudert and Couharde regressions, for 
Croatia and Turkey, no major initial undervaluation can be observed and, the results, especially 
those based on Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004) show remarkable stability over time. For Bulgaria, 
the currency seems to be undervalued, but this undervaluation is stable over time. This means 
that the time series estimations for Bulgaria as for Croatia and Turkey may be viewed as 
unbiased in the sense of initial undervaluation. For Romania, Russia and Ukraine, the initial 
undervalutions are large, but over time, the real exchange rates, though still undervalued in 2003, 
have closed the gap to the level that would be in line with GDP per capita. For these countries, 
there might be scope for a bias for the entire period. But we may be on the safe side if time series 
estimations are carried out only for a more recent period, beginning in 1994 – 1996, after which 
period the undervaluation turns out to be stable. 
Figure 4 Under- and Overvaluations in Terms of Productivity Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A positive (negative) figure stands for overvaluation (undervaluation). CC denotes Coudert and Couharde (2003), MF is Maeso-Fernandez, 
Osbat and Schnatz (2004), and CH1, CH2 and CH3 are the three regressions taken from Cihak and Holub (2003). 
 
 
                                                 
10 Čihák and Holub (2003) note that one should interpret the temporal development of data based on the International Price 
Comparison (IPC) program, i.e. level real exchange rates, with care. The annual data are based on interpolation/extrapolation of 
actual price observations taken once every three years. The error margin of such an interpolation/extrapolation may be as high as 
6%. Notice also, however, that the data here are not used to derive precise misalignment figures but rather to provide some 
broader trends. 
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4.1 Potential Sources of Real Appreciation 
As shown earlier, the currencies of the countries under study are all undervalued in terms of PPP. 
At the same time, Figure 2 and Figure 5, plotting the real effective exchange rates of the 
countries on the basis of monthly data, reveal that the real exchange rate of some of the countries 
studied underwent, to a varying extent, an appreciation during the last 10 years or so. 
 
Figure 5 Log Real Effective Exchange Rates (CPI-Based), Monthly Data (1996:01=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the extent of the undervaluation of the level real exchange rate of different groups of 
goods and services for Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey may give us an idea regarding the 
potential sources of the real appreciation. The largest undervaluation can be observed for 
nontradable goods. The undervaluation of the real exchange rate of regulated services is 
considerably larger than that of market-based services. Also, goods, especially nondurable 
(mostly domestically produced and consumed) goods turn out to be undervalued, though to a 
lesser extent (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. The Real Exchange Rate in Levels for Different Groups of Goods and Services,2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: NMS10 denotes the ten new EU member states 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data drawn from NewCronos/Eurostat. 
 
4.2 The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis 
The large undervaluation of market services reported in Figure 4 may be explained by the 
absolute version of the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect, which is generally thought to be a 
source of real appreciation in a successful catching-up process. To analyze the size of the 
inflation to be attributed to the B-S effect (
S - B P ), let us consider the following equation used in 
Égert (2005): 
) PROD (PROD α) (1 P
NT T
1
S - B − − = β       ( 5 )  
where  α) (1−  is the share of nontradables in the consumer basket,  1 β  conceptually corresponds 
to the estimated coefficient, which connects the relative price of nontradables to productivity, 
and which, ideally, should be 1. PROD is the average labor productivity in the tradable (T) and 
nontradable (NT) sectors. 
Average annual growth rates of the different measures of dual productivity are computed for the 
countries under consideration using annual data from national accounts for two periods, 1991–
2001/2003 and 1996–2001/2003. For Turkey, the series start in 1970. This is why two 
subperiods are considered additionally for this country, namely 1970–2003 and 1970–1990.
11 
The open sector is constructed using manufacturing, or if not available, industry, and for which 
                                                 
11 It should be mentioned that the productivity figures may be biased downward for Russia and Ukraine because from 1995 to 
1998, huge numbers of employees were forced to take unpaid leaves. Hence, they are included in the statistics even if they did 
not contribute to output. 
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the closed sector includes the rest except for health, education, public administration and other 
community services (non-market closed sectors). Agriculture once is part of the closed sector 
(DIFF2), and is excluded from the analysis once (DIFF1).
12 The coefficient  1 β  is restricted to 
1.
13 
In addition, average annual growth rates are computed using monthly industrial production-based 
productivity measures.
14 Using industrial production data, it is assumed that productivity changes 
in the closed sector is zero.  
When comparing growth rates of productivity based on industrial production to growth rates in 
productivity based on national accounts, it appears that the two measures are broadly in line with 
data based on national accounts for Croatia, Russia and Turkey and to a lesser extent for 
Ukraine. By contrast, for Bulgaria and Romania, the reported figures based on industrial 
production are considerably higher than national accounts-based data when only manufacturing 
or industry is taken as the open sector. The reason for this is that in these two countries, 
productivity increased substantially in the closed sectors. 
The basic assumptions, which would ensure the B-S effect to be at work were analyzed both 
graphically using annual data and econometrically for monthly data. It turns out that with the 
exception of Croatia and Russia, the pass-through from productivity changes in the open sector 
to the relative price of nontradables is not proportionate but it is lower than one for Bulgaria, 
Romania and Ukraine (attenuation of the B-S effect) and is higher than one for Turkey 
(amplification of the B-S effect). Regarding the stability of the real exchange rate in the open 
sector, the only country, for which stationarity could be detected is Turkey. This means that for 
                                                 
12 A twofold rule for separating sectors into open and closed sectors in that we consider a sector to belonging to the open sector if 
(1) goods in this sector are potentially subject to good arbitrage leading to price equalization across countries, and if (2) it is 
governed by market forces. This yields a classification which is in contrast with, for instance, MacDonald and Wójcik (2004) and 
Mihaljek and Klau (2004), who argued that tourism, trade and transportation can also be considered open sector. To check the 
sensitivity of the data to classification issues, we proceeded to calculating alternative measures for open and closed sectors. 
Overall, how the sectors are classified into open and closed sectors might have a large impact. An example is Bulgaria, where 
dual productivity is negative when transport and telecommunications are taken as a closed sector, but it becomes highly positive 
when the same sector is considered an open sector. The opposite is true for Ukraine. However, some countries such as Croatia 
and Russia are less influenced by the choice of sectoral classification. Another data related issue is that whether average labor 
productivity is calculated on the basis of sectoral employment or employee data may matter. This is especially the case for 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
13 This relationship is estimated using monthly data, according to which a coefficient equal to 1 seems to be a reasonable 
assumption for Bulgaria and Russia. Because this coefficient is lower than 1 for the remaining countries, the reported figures 
could be viewed as upper-bound estimates. The results are available upon request from the author. 
14 The same periods were considered here as for the national accounts-based data. For Croatia, Romania and Russia, data for 
2003 (not available from national accounts) are also shown for comparison purposes.   18
the remaining countries, the B-S effect can be at best a partial explanation for movements in the 
real exchange rate. 
The inflation rate that can be associated with the B-S effect is quantified relying on equation 5. 
Table 2 reports the composition of the harmonized CPI for Bulgaria and Romania. It turns out 
that the share of services is slightly above 30% whereas the share of market-based services is 
about 15%. The general experience of the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe 
shows that the corresponding shares in the national CPIs are slightly higher than in the HICP. 
Hence, a share of 20% can be thought of as a reasonable measure for market services for 
Bulgaria and Romania. Going one step further, because the countries studied here are 
comparable with the same level of development, 20% can be viewed as a reasonable estimate for 
the share of market-based nontradables for all of the countries covered in this study. 
Table 2 The Share of Different Groups of Items in the HICP (in percent) in 2002 
NMS10 Bulgaria Romania 
Goods, of which  28.1 21.1 20.8
  Durable  7.9 2.2 1.5
  Semi-durable  10.5 6.6 9.0
  Non-durable  9.7 12.4 10.2
Energy  4.7 4.2 4.7
Food, of which  29.9 43.4 46.3
  Alcohol&tobacco  6.7 4.5 5.2
Services  48.9 34.0 32.0
of which regulated  15.3 18.0 16.8
Source: Calculations based on disaggregated HICP data drawn from NewCronos/Eurostat. NMS10 stands for the 
ten new EU member states. 
 
Results in Table 3 indicate that the B-S effect may be negative for Bulgaria irrespective of the 
period considered and for Croatia for 1991–2002 when using data based on national accounts. 
However, industrial production-based figures indicate a positive effect. This is mainly because 
such figures do not take account of productivity increases in services. However, if considering 
productivity increases in services, as is the case for the other countries, results based on national 
accounts and on industrial production are fairly similar. Nevertheless, the effect rises to about 0.8 
percentage point in Croatia for the period of 1996–2002. Table 3 also indicates a 1.1 percentage 
point average annual contribution to inflation of the B-S effect in Russia and Ukraine. The effect 
fluctuates around 0.2 percentage point in Turkey. Finally, the effect strengthens pretty much for 
the second half of the period studied in Romania, as it hovers around 1.9 percentage points. 
Nevertheless, when comparing these figures to the average inflation rates of the observed period, 
Croatia is the only country for which the B-S effect has an important effect from 1996–2002, as 
it explains roughly up to one-fifth of the observed inflation. This is in line with findings in   19
Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2002) who argue that the B-S effect is not a major player in Bulgaria. 
Also, the amplitude of the B-S effect is broadly in line with findings for the eight new EU 
Member States in Central and Eastern Europe.
15 
What remains to be done is to get an estimate for the B-S effect for the foreign benchmark in 
order to be able to assess the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which could be explained by 
the dual productivity differential. For this purpose, we use the average of three studies known to 
us which provide the needed figure for Germany, which is taken as a proxy for the euro area 
during the 1990s: 0.25%.
16 For the industrial production-based productivity measure, the two 
figures which can be obtained using equation (1) are 1.2% for 1992–2003 and 1.0% for 1996–
2003.
17 When adjusting the figures reported in Table 3 appropriately, the equilibrium exchange 
rate appreciates in Romania, Russia and Ukraine, while the direction of a change in the 
equilibrium exchange rate hinges on whether or not national accounts or industrial production-
based data are used in Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey. However, using data obtained from national 
accounts seems more appropriate for measuring the B-S effect. This would imply an equilibrium 
depreciation in Bulgaria, an equilibrium appreciation in Croatia and a constant equilibrium 
exchange rate in Turkey. 
                                                 
15 See Égert et al. (2004), for a summary of the results. 
16 For Germany, Swagel (1999), Lommatzsch and Tober (2003) and Égert et al. (2003) estimated the size of the B-S effect as 0% 
(1990–1996), 0.1% (1995–2002) and 0.55% (1995–2000), respectively.  
17 The share of nontradables in the CPI is set to 40%.   20
Table 3 The Contribution of the B-S Effect to Average Annual CPI in Percentage Points 
   DIFF1_Old  DIFF2_Old    IND_PROD  Observed  CPI 
           Period  average  2003 
BULGARIA  1991-2003  -0.96%  -0.79% 1992-2003 1.79%  145.2%   
 1996-2003  -1.48%  -1.42% 1996-2003 1.54%  153.4%  2.3% 
CROATIA  1991-2002  -0.02%  -0.06% 1992-2002 0.63%  203.0%   
 1996-2002  0.82%  0.67% 1996-2002  0.60%  4.3%  1.8% 
RUSSIA  1991-2001  1.17%  0.67%     292.3%   
 1996-2001  1.00%  0.58% 1996-2001  1.11%  36.4%  13.6%
UKRAINE  1991-2002  0.99%  0.79%     675.9%   
 1996-2002  0.14%  0.95% 1996-2002  1.94%  24.3%  5.2% 
   DIFF1_New  DIFF2_New         
BULGARIA  1996-2003  -0.27%  -0.21% 1996-2003 1.54%  153.4%  2.3% 
ROMANIA  1991-2002  0.19%  0.52%     100.6%   
 1996-2002  1.43%  1.68% 1996-2002  1.84%  57.3%  15.3%
   DIFF1_TK  DIFF2_TK         
TURKEY  1970-2003  0.33%  0.27%     50.4%   
 1970-1990  0.22%  0.26%     39.2%   
 1991-2003  0.22%  0.05% 1991-2003  0.50%  68.6%   
 1996-2003  0.36%  0.07% 1996-2003  0.14%  61.9%   
 1994-2001  0.08%  -0.06% 1994-2001  -0.10%  77.4%  25.3%
EURO AREA    NATIONAL ACCOUNTS     IND_PROD    
 1991-2003  0.25%     1.00%     
 1996-2003       0.80%     
Source: Average annual inflation is computed based on data drawn from WIIW and from the OECD Economic Outlook for Turkey. IND_PROD 
refers to average labor productivity obtained on the basis of industrial production. 
Note: For the industrial production-based figures, the same periods are shown as for the national account-based data mainly for the sake of full 
comparability. The extension of the period till 2003 for Croatia, Romania and Russia would not change too much. DIFF1 is the measure of dual 
productivity when agriculture is excluded both from the open and closed sectors, while it is included in the open sector for DIFF2. DIFF_Old 
refers to data obtained from old SNA national account standards (for Russia and Ukraine, data only on this basis are available), DIFF_New stands 
for data based on new NACE classifications. 
 
4.3. The Dutch Disease in Russia 
Regarding the basic proposition number 1 of the D-D hypothesis for the case of Russia, wage 
equalization, as already discussed earlier, does not appear to be too heroic an assumption. 
Analyzing the symptoms of the Dutch Disease in Russia, Figure 7 shows that the real exchange 
rate of the Russian ruble vis-à-vis both the euro and the U.S. dollar underwent some appreciation 
episodes. The most notable is the steady appreciation from 1999 onward.  
With regard to proposition number 2, Figure 7 also plots the ratio of monthly crude oil 
production to industrial production in volume. The relative share of crude oil, fuel and natural 
gas in total exports grew from 40% in 1994 to above 50% in 2003. At the same time, the share of 
metal exports dropped considerably, whereas the share of machinery and equipment exports 
remained fairly stable. This indicates that only the commodity exporting sectors are crowded out. 
The graph also indicates that the value added at constant prices in some of the nontradable 
sectors, namely trade and agriculture, grew faster than that in industry. By contrast, transport and 
telecommunications move broadly in line with industry. Finally, the Russian trade balance has 
exhibited large surpluses since the early 1990s. Overall, it seems that some of the symptoms of   21
the D-D phenomenon are present in Russia and that there may therefore be some scope for the 
D-D effect in Russia. This analysis holds true especially for the period after 1999. 
 
Figure 7 Propositions of the Dutch Disease Model, Russia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: WIIW, European Intelligence Unit, Datastream. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Time Series Results 
As shown earlier, the B-S effect may play only a limited role in the countries under study. This is 
why a unified framework is changes in productivity may affect the exchange rate via channels 
different than the B-S effect, and which also incorporate the effect of net foreign assets, public 
expenditures, public debt and openness for all of the countries and the Dutch Disease for Russia 
and Ukraine. 
Tables 4 to 9 below show the estimation results based on alternative time series cointegration 
techniques.
18 As a rule of thumb, the lag structure given by the Schwarz criterion is retained. 
                                                 
18 The time periods used are given by data availability. The period starts in 1985 for Turkey, and in 1993 or later for the rest of 
the sample. As we have shown earlier, a large part of the initial undervaluation had been corrected by the mid-1990s. Therefore 
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However, when lag structures provided by the alternative information criteria (Akaike and 
Hannan-Quinn) yield better results, they are preferred and are reported in Tables 4 to 9. 
For Bulgaria, using a dummy capturing the 1996 and 1997 financial crisis
19, only DOLS 
estimates show the presence of cointegration and yield statistically significant coefficient 
estimates for the CPI-based real exchange rate, while for the PPI-deflated real exchange rate, 
both the DOLS and ARDL approaches indicate cointegration. Note that no cointegration could 
be found when public expenditures as a share of GDP are employed. If significant, the 
productivity variable has always a negative sign
20. Net foreign assets become significant mostly 
only with the inclusion of the control variables. In those cases, they have a positive sign, 
implying that a decrease in net foreign assets is associated with an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate. If significant, the control variables are correctly signed: an increase in real oil 
prices and in cumulated public deficits (as a proxy for public debt) causes the real exchange rate 
to depreciate, and a rise in openness also yields a real depreciation.  
Regarding Croatia, it is rather difficult to establish cointegration relationships using the residual-
based tests and the bounds testing approach. Weak evidence for cointegration is, however, 
provided by the error correction terms, which are often significant with a negative sign. Of these 
cases, the productivity variable has an unambiguous negative sign. Contrary to Bulgaria, the sign 
on net foreign assets is always negative: a decrease in this variable is linked to a real 
depreciation. Real oil prices and openness are found significant only with DOLS, but then they 
are correctly signed. The public deficit is always significant but has a positive sign (an increase 
leads to a real appreciation). At the same time, the productivity variable becomes insignificant 
and switches signs, pointing to possible multicollinearity among the two variables. Results are 
most robust when public expenditures in GDP are included, given that all two estimation 
techniques both for the CPI-based and the PPI-based real exchange rate yield similar results in 
terms of both signs and significance. Public expenditures seem to capture demand-side effects, as 
an increase in this variable is reflected in a real appreciation of the Croatian kuna. 
Turning now to Romania, when it is found statistically significant, the productivity variable 
enters all equations with a positive sign for the whole period, with the exception when the PPI-
                                                                                                                                                             
the criticism by Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2004) that the long-term coefficients will be biased because of initial undervaluation 
applies to our case only to a limited extent. 
19 It takes the value of 1 from 1996:3 to 1997:6, and is zero otherwise   23
deflated real exchange rate and public expenditures are estimated using DOLS. Splitting the 
sample in 1998 allowed us to uncover that the productivity variable becomes negative in the 
baseline specification.
21 However, the use of the control variable reverses the sign once again. 
Also, while mostly positive for the whole period, the sign on net foreign assets becomes negative 
for the second half of the period studied. 
For Russia, it is also difficult to detect cointegration in an unambiguous way even using a 
dummy that captures the post-1998 period (1999:01 to 2003:12). For the cases with a significant 
and negatively singed error correction term, productivity appears to be mostly linked negatively 
to the real exchange rate, especially for the baseline scenario. The sign on net foreign assets is 
found to be negative for the baseline scenario. This result changes when the control variables are 
included, and the sign becomes systematically positive. It should be mentioned that the oil 
revenue variable becomes significant only if another control variable (OPEN, PDEBT or EXP) is 
used, and in particular when using the real exchange rate deflated by PPI.
22 In these cases, it 
bears a negative sign, implying that an increase in oil revenues causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate. Note also that for cases when the oil revenue variable becomes significant, the 
productivity variable tends to be insignificant. 
As far as Ukraine is concerned, the results appear more robust than previous results.
23 
Productivity and net foreign assets are mostly significant irrespective of the specifications. Like 
for Russia, NFA are linked to the real exchange rate through a positive sign. Of the control 
variables, the share of public expenditures in GDP is highly significant and has a negative sign 
confirming the demand-side channel. The real oil price variable has a negative sign. At first 
sight, this is surprising because Ukraine is not a net oil-exporting country. However, this finding 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Recall that a negative sign means that an increase in productivity leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
21 Results for the period 1998 to 2003 are not reported here. 
22 Sosunov and Zamulin (2004) use a general equilibrium model to investigate the appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
Russia. After calibrating their model, they come to the conclusion that the real exchange rate can be modeled as a function of the 
oil price with an elasticity of about 0.3. We try to match this finding with the data and perform cointegration tests between the 
real exchange rate and the real oil price for the whole period and for the post-1998 period. Strapafora and Stavrev (2003) also 
analyze the real exchange rate of the Russian ruble. Using quarterly data and the Phillips and Loretan (1991) cointregration 
technique, they find that the productivity variable, the oil price and a 1998 dummy significantly enter the real exchange rate 
equation. We also take a look at this specification. We estimated these specifications and the oil variable (real and nominal oil 
prices and oil revenue) turned out to be statistically insignificant. There may be several reasons why oil revenues variables are 
often found to be insignificant: First, oil prices may be too volatile on a monthly frequency to be cointegrated with the other, 
more stable variables. Second, changes in oil prices may impact on the real exchange rate not instantaneously but with a given 
lag. So, it would be expedient to use smoothed values for the oil revenue variable (e.g. moving averages) and to include them in 
the long-term relationship with some lag. 
23 Data for openness are available starting only in November 1999, which is a hindrance for the specification including openness 
to be estimated for Ukraine.   24
may be the outcome of a spillover effect from Russian oil revenues: the transit of oil through 
Ukraine may generate revenues in function of changes in oil prices. 
Turning to Turkey, several interesting things emerge from the estimation results obtained for the 
period of 1985–2003. Although productivity is usually found to be cointegrated with the real 
exchange rate with the expected negative sign, the sign on net foreign assets depends largely on 
the inclusion of control variables and whether or not CPI- or PPI-based real exchange rates are 
used. On the one hand, . In the baseline specification and when using openness or real oil prices, 
the sign of the net foreign assets variable is positive. However, when the estimations are 
performed using public debt or public expenditures, the sign becomes negative. Note that the 
public debt and expenditure variables are significant and have the expected sign. Like in 
Ukraine, the real oil price variable is negatively signed, although Turkey is a net oil-importing 
country. 
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Table 4. Time Series Estimation Results, Bulgaria 
 CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1993:01 – 2003:12  1993:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1993:01 – 2003:12  1997:12 – 2003:12 
 DOLS 
(0,2) 
ARDL 
(4,2) 
DOLS 
(0,2) 
ARDL 
(4,2) 
DOLS 
(0,2) 
ARDL 
(3,0) 
DOLS 
(0,2) 
ARDL 
(4,0) 
DOLS 
(1,2) 
ARDL
(4,1) 
DOLS 
(0,2) 
ARDL 
(4,1) 
DOLS 
(0,2) AIC 
ARDL 
(4,0) 
DOLS 
(1,4) AIC 
ARDL 
(4,0) 
DOLS 
(0,0) 
ARDL
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(0,0) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
COINT  -5.93** (1)  4.034a  -5.733** (1)  6.826**  -5.969*** (1) 1.697  -5.763*** (1) 5.227**  -5.731*** (1) 1.551  -5.589*** (1) 2.223  -5.908*** (1) 5.185**  -5.773*** (1) 10.204** -1.229 (2) -0.856  -1.531 (0) -0.52 
ECT  -0.195*** -0.109 -0.339*** -0.25*** -0.191*** -0.209** -0.339*** -0.329*** -0.208*** -0.152 -0.364*** -0.334**  -0.256*** -0.238*** -0.358***  -0.386*** -0.031  -0.051 -0.02 -0.023 
CONST  -0.492*** -0.632  0.244*** 0.222** -0.73*** -0.611  0.112 0.236 -0.251 -1.065  0.692*** 0.281 -0.717*** -1.177*** 0.219** -0.269** -0.552*** -0.318  0.091 0.309 
PROD  -0.99*** -0.951 -0.819*** -0.911*** -1.062*** -0.968** -0.859*** -0.877*** -0.934*** -0.619 -0.887*** -0.766**  -0.545*** 0.256 -0.772***  0.11  -0.584*** -1.231 -0.362** -1.037 
NFA  0.143 0.03  0.454*** 0.242  0.511** 0.04  0.657*** 0.169 0.465*** 0.573 0.579*** 0.504  0.37** 0.529  0.432*** 0.732**  0.897***  0.799  0.982***  1.082 
ROIL       0.123** 0.027  0.069 -0.005                   
OPEN           0.173 -0.277  0.299*** 0.062              
PDEBT               -0.357** -1.098*** -0.062 -0.881***        
EXP                    0.041***  0.012  0.025**  0.018 
DUMMY  0.048* 0.3*  0.073*** 0.181**  0.016 0.095  0.055** 0.13*  -0.023 0.213 -0.007 0.105 0.102*** 0.284*** 0.083*** 0.254***        
Notes: The shadowed columns indicate that the given equation is used for the derivation of real misalignments. CPI and PPI refer to the estimation results for the CPI-based and the PPI-based real exchange rates, 
respectively. a) indicates ambiguity in the sense that the tests statistic lies in a range where there is no clear indication of the absence or existence of a cointegrating relationship)(Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). The 
periods indicated in the header of the table show the longest period available for all the variables. ECT is the error correction term, COINT is the residual-based cointegration test (DOLS) and the F-test based 
cointegration test (ARDL). LAG indicates the lag structure. If not indicated otherwise, the lag structure is based on the Schwarz information criterion. AIC and HQ meands that the lag structure is determined using the 
Akaike and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion, respectively. FIX indicates that lags (and leads) correspond to the maximum lag length (=4). CONST, PROD, NFA, ROIL, OPEN, DEF and EXP are the constant 
term, the dual productivity differential, net foreign assets to GDP, real oil prices, the openness ration, public debt and public expenditures as share of GDP. DUMMY is a dummy term capturing the financial crisis 
occurred in 1996 and 1997. It takes the value of 1 from 1996:3 to 1997:6, and is zero otherwise. 
Table 5. Time Series Estimation Results, Croatia 
 CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1993:01 – 2003:12  1993:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1995:01 – 2003:12  1995:12 – 2003:12 
 DOLS 
(0,3) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(0,3) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(0,3) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(0,3) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(4,2) HQ
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(4,2) HQ
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(1,2) 
ARDL 
(1,3) AIC
DOLS 
(0,0) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
COINT  -1.888 (0)  -1.577  -1.532 (0)  -0.736  -1.877 (0)  -2.322  -1.815 (0)  -2.204  -1.999 (0)  -2.195  -2.103 (1)  -2.824  -3.686 (1)  2.55  -4.309*** (1) 1.552  -1.982 (0) 3.536a  -4.717*** 
(1) 
1.418 
ECT  -0.054  -0.082*  -0.017  -0.059  -0.052 -0.082* -0.038 -0.082** -0.065* -0.084* -0.043  -0.064  -0.146*** -0.175*** -0.127** -0.174*** -0.146**  -0.357*** -0.23***  -0.308*** 
CONST  -0.071*** -0.085* -0.055***  -0.085  -0.078***  0.019  0.026  0.212  0.018  0.247  0.05  0.278  -0.136*** -0.155*** -0.106*** -0.123*** -0.377*** -0.382*** -0.455***  -0.446*** 
PROD  -0.63***  -0.205  -0.614*** 0.373 -0.639***  -0.201  -0.605*** 0.111 -0.365***  -0.201  -0.347***  0.352  -0.058 0.144 -0.123 0.157  -0.438*** -0.628*** -0.756***  -0.705*** 
NFA  -0.066*** -0.06 -0.187***  -0.2  -0.064*** -0.079 -0.202***  -0.244** -0.097***  -0.055  -0.209*** -0.197 -0.279*** -0.33*** -0.411***  -0.441*** -0.138*** -0.082*  -0.182***  -0.181*** 
ROIL        0.003  -0.045  -0.035***  -0.123*                     
OPEN               0.072**  0.189  0.076**  0.207              
PDEBT                    1.144***  1.506***  1.377***  1.595***        
EXP                            -0.172*** -0.197*** -0.271***  -0.265*** 
Note: As for Table 4.  26
 
Table 6. Time Series Estimation Results, Romania 
 CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12 
 DOLS 
(3,1) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
(4,4) FIX 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
(3,1) 
ARDL 
(4,4) FIX
DOLS 
(2,0) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
(3,0) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
(2,0) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
 (3,1) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS  
(4,0) 
ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS 
(4,4) AIC
ARDL 
(3,3) AIC
DOLS 
(4,4) AIC
ARDL 
(1,1) 
COINT  -2.394 (0)  1.59  -2.44 (0)  4.347*  -2.378 (0)  2.643  -3.23 (1) 2.89a  -2.618 (0)  1.471  -2.904 (0) 3.668a  -2.362 (0)  1.014  -2.429 (0)  3.211a -1.758  (0) 3.511a -3.219 (1) 4.047* 
ECT  -0.102** -0.134*** -0.125***  -0.186*** -0.105**  -0.164***  -0.136*** -0.185*** -0.125*** -0.142*** -0.171*** -0.205***  -0.102**  -0.118*** -0.132*** -0.168*** -0.11***  -0.15***  -0.132*** -0.214*** 
CONST  -0.024 0.014  -0.111***  -0.045 -0.097  0.309 -0.148  0.053 -0.448 0.333 -1.26***  -0.093  0.023  -0.091  -0.092**  -0.146 0.638***  -1.306** 0.44 -1.192** 
PROD  0.699*** 0.412  0.179** -0.166 0.658*** 0.768** -0.026 -0.081 0.754*** 0.156 0.442**  -0.246 0.864***  0.057  0.079  -0.485  0.472*** 0.573* -0.295*** -0.101 
NFA  0.751*** 0.726*** 0.576*** 0.579*** 0.768***  0.751** 0.629*** 0.577** 0.634***  0.775**  0.305***  0.545** 0.632*** 0.964*** 0.515*** 0.782*** 0.813***  0.791*** 0.693*** 0.64*** 
ROIL         0.035  -0.139  0.045  -0.046                     
OPEN                -0.209  0.147  -0.574*** -0.027             
PDEBT                    1.539**  -3.196  0.364  -2.885        
EXP                             0.257***  -0.57**  0.172 -0.506** 
Note: As for Table 4. 
 
Table 7. Time Series Estimation Results, Russia 
 CPI  PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1994:01 – 2003:12  1995:01 – 2003:12 
 DOLS 
(4,0) 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(3,1)  
ARDL 
(3,1) AIC 
DOLS 
(3,0) 
ARDL 
(3,1) HQ
DOLS 
(3,1)  
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(2,0)  
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS 
(2,1)  
ARDL 
(1,2) HQ 
DOLS 
(4,4)  
ARDL 
(1,2) HQ
DOLS 
 (4,4)  
ARDL 
(1,0) HQ
DOLS 
(2,4) AIC
ARDL 
(1,4) AIC
DOLS 
(2,1) 
ARDL 
(1,4) AIC 
COINT  -2.615 (1)  2.651  -2.31 (0)  4.52*  -2.65 (1)  5.251**  -2.644 (0) 1.189 -3.187  (1)  3.181a  -3.13 (0)  5.707**  -1.958 (1)  6.269** -1.806  (0)  2.947a  -2.012 (1) 2.801a  -1.871 (0) 3.219a 
ECT  -0.083*** -0.1***  -0.044 -0.143*** -0.085** -0.128*** -0.066* -0.078* -0.218***  -0.178*** -0.246*** -0.351***  -0.132***  -0.28*** -0.094*  -0.176*** -0.238*** -0.374*** -0.258*** -0.444*** 
CONST  -0.577*** 0.051  -1.109***  -0.517 -0.667***  0.071 -0.866*** 1.259 0.07 0.89  0.399  1.809  -0.421***  0.397 -0.704*** 0.637  -0.755 0.407  -1.11* 0.59 
PROD  -0.809*** -2.538***  -0.954*** -2.407**  -0.814***  -1.568*  -0.179 -3.176  -0.573  -0.95 0.251  0.028  -0.142  -1.062** 0.646***  -1.656*  -0.609* -1.188* 0.319  -0.925 
NFA  -0.012 0.181  -0.127**  0.049 -0.049  0.201 -0.042  0.619*  0.107***  0.246**  0.1**  0.402*** 0.01  0.342*** -0.027 0.497*** 0.156*** 0.173*  0.184*** 0.239** 
REV_OIL         -0.023  -0.083  -0.281*** -0.657  -0.085*  -0.158  -0.299*** -0.451***  -0.065*  -0.300*** -0.287***  -0.565** -0.032 -0.057  -0.31*** -0.244* 
OPEN               0.172  0.37  0.458  0.719            
PDEBT                     0.796  -1.729 0.271 -4.373       
EXP                         -0.129 0.106  -0.173 0.152 
DUMMY  0.326*** 0.067  0.639***  0.411 0.405***  0.012 0.574*** -0.386 0.144* -0.091  0.249**  -0.271  0.052 -0.074 0.182* -0.022  0.078 0.133  0.18**  0.208 
Note: As for Table 4. DUMMY is a dummy term capturing the post-1998 crisis period.  It takes the value of 1 from 1999:01 to 2003:12, and is zero otherwise. 
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Table 8. Time Series Estimation Results, Ukraine 
  CPI PPI  CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1996:01 – 2003:12  1996:01 – 2003:12  1996:01 – 2003:12  1996:01 – 2003:12 
  DOLS 
 (0,0) 
ARDL 
 (1,0) 
DOLS 
 (4,4) FIX 
ARDL 
 (1,1) 
DOLS  
(0,0) 
ARDL 
 (4,4) FIX
DOLS 
 (4,4) 
ARDL 
 (4,4) FIX
DOLS 
 (4,0) 
ARDL 
 (1,1) AIC 
DOLS  
(4,0) 
ARDL 
 (1,4) AIC
DOLS 
 (1,0) 
ARDL 
 (4,1) HQ
DOLS 
 (4,0) 
ARDL 
 (2,4) AIC
COINT  -4.384** (1)  -0.375  -3.36 (1)  -1.155  -4.487*** (1) 2.536  -3.261 (1) 2.55  -4.182*** (1) 3.46a  -4.209*** (1) 6.014**  -4.17*** (1) 5.719** -3.942 4.649** 
ECT  -0.07 -0.133***  -0.047  -0.145*** -0.084* -0.058  -0.061** -0.09  -0.138***  -0.222***  -0.149*** -0.305*** -0.292***  -0.286*** -0.233*** -0.253***
CONST  -0.177***  -0.175* 0.032 -0.122*  -0.031 5.617***  0.906*** 2.679*** -0.134***  -0.129***  -0.068*** -0.087*** -1.28***  -1.101*** -0.75*** -0.656** 
PROD  -0.489*** -0.628* -0.33*** -0.38*  -0.487*** 0.093  -0.228* -0.479 -0.535***  -0.533***  -0.204*** -0.329*** -0.483***  -0.407*** -0.195*** -0.198***
NFA  0.487* 0.469  1.588***  -0.063 0.644** 5.803*  2.572*** 3.036**  0.817***  0.693*  0.44*** 0.408  0.371***  0.364** 0.117  0.2 
ROIL        -0.056 -2.137*** -0.334*** -1.025***             
PDEBT              0.014  -0.031  -0.042 -0.085       
EXP                     -0.468***  -0.387*** -0.285*** -0.248** 
DUMMY  0.4*** 0.419**  0.173**  0.485*** 0.389*** -0.376 0.071 0.118 0.339***  0.33***  0.327*** 0.37***  0.023  0.082 0.141***  0.156** 
Note: As for Table 4. DUMMY is a dummy term capturing the post-1998 crisis period.  It takes the value of 1 from 1999:01 to 2003:12, and is zero otherwise. 
 
Table 9. Time Series Estimation Results, Turkey 
 CPI  PPI CPI  PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI  CPI PPI 
  1985:01 – 2003:12 
  DOLS (0,0)  ARDL 
(1,1) 
DOLS (0,0)  ARDL 
(1,4) AIC 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL (1,0) DOLS (4,4) 
AIC 
ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0)  ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0)  ARDL 
(1,0) 
DOLS (0,0) ARDL (1,0) DOLS (4,4) 
AIC 
ARDL (1,0) 
COINT  -3.663* (0)  3.367a  -3.753* (0)  5.32**  -3.649 (0)  1.081  -4.23*** (1) 1.565  -3.69 (0)  0.982  -4.495*** (1) 1.756  -4.94*** (0)  4.654**  -4.108*** (0) 1.828  -4.39*** (0) 3.089a  -3.905* (1) 1.489 
ECT  -0.101*** -0.11*** -0.109*** -0.132*** -0.101*** -0.11***  -0.119*** -0.128*** -0.101*** -0.11*** -0.121*** -0.138***  -0.171*** -0.174*** -0.117*** -0.125*** -0.135*** -0.145*** -0.109*** -0.118*** 
CONST  0.159*** 0.25*** 0.066*** 0.124** 0.276*** 0.109 0.44*** 0.335  0.327* 0.314  0.737***  0.649 0.167*** 0.201*** 0.069*** 0.113**  -0.557*** -0.542*  -0.072 0.132 
PROD  -0.384*** 0.38 -0.414*** 0.483 -0.413*** 0.22 -0.274** 0.047  -0.325** 0.321  -0.162  0.258  -0.751*** -0.476 -0.557*** -0.152  -0.751*** -0.38 -0.316*** 0.096 
NFA  0.193** 0.429  -0.212*** -0.523*  0.24*** 0.12 -0.168* -0.229 0.303** 0.194 0.203** 0.029 -0.332*** -0.52* -0.428*** -0.635* -0.24** -0.353  -0.426*** -0.298 
ROIL       -0.043 0.034  -0.136*** -0.086                
OPEN           0.077 0.049  0.309***  0.252           
PDEBT                1.086*** 1.402*** 0.447*** 0.667*      
EXP                     -0.283*** -0.283**  -0.06 0.009 
DUMMY1  0.129*** 0.109 0.158*** 0.093  0.12*** 0.152  0.104*** 0.132  0.117*** 0.129 0.121*** 0.124  0.182*** 0.198**  0.18*** 0.179*  0.18*** 0.199**  0.133*** 0.148 
DUMMY2  -0.075** 0.127 -0.083*** -0.051  -0.065* 0.014 -0.027 -0.023  -0.072** 0.029  -0.074*** -0.038  0.094*** 0.208**  -0.015 0.066  -0.007 0.03  -0.072** -0.053 
Note: As for Table 4. DUMMY1 and DUMMY2 are dummy terms capturing the 1994 crisis period and the post-2001 crisis period. They take the value of 1 from 1993:06 to 
1995:06 and from 2000:11 to 2003:12, respectively, and are zero otherwise. 
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5.2. Panel Results 
The estimation results obtained on the basis of a panel including Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey for the period 1994 to 2004 are very robust compared to the 
country-by-country time series results. What should be mentioned first is the fact that the error 
correction term of the ARDL mean group estimator (MGE) is always negative and significant, 
which implies the presence of cointegration. Second, the productivity and net foreign assets 
variables are mostly always significant and the signs are also found to be very stable. 
Productivity is negatively signed, whereas net foreign assets have a positive sign. The use of 
control variables changes this picture only slightly. Regarding the control variables themselves, 
real oil prices appear to be negatively signed. This is somewhat surprising, given that Russia is 
the only net oil-exporting country. The openness ratio is significant and is correctly signed. 
However, the sign on the public debt and the public expenditures ratios differ for the CPI-based 
real exchange rate and the PPI-based real exchange rate. 
 
Table 10. Panel Estimation Results 
 
Note: DOLS and MGE are the panel DOLS and ARDL mean group estimators. ECT is the error correction term. CPI and PPI refer to the 
estimation results for the CPI-based and the PPI-based real exchange rates, respectively. 
5.3. Real Misalignments 
As a final step of our analysis, we derive the deviation of the observed real effective exchange 
rate from the estimated equilibrium real effective exchange rate, i.e. the total real misalignment. 
For this purpose, both time series and panel estimates are used. Among the estimated time series 
   ECT  PROD  NFA  ROIL  OPEN  PDEBT  EXP 
CPI  DOLS    -0.353***  0.743***         
  MGE  -0.172***  -0.610*  0.641***         
PPI     -0.356***  0.603***      
   -0.124***  -1.244***  0.78***      
CPI  DOLS    -0.426***  0.165***  -0.061**       
 MGE  -0.100***  -0.400 0.656*** -0.176**       
PPI     -0.375*** 0.827*** -0.076***      
   -0.153***  -1.08***  1.032*** -0.368**       
CPI  DOLS    -0.040***  0.317***    0.242***     
 MGE  -0.143***  -0.257 0.482***   0.312*    
PPI     0.004***  0.320   0.372***    
    -0.207***  -0.445*  0.324**   0.299    
CPI  DOLS    -0.236***  0.633***      0.350***   
  MGE  -0.134***  -0.422*  0.570***      -2.784   
PPI     -0.160*** 0.501***     -0.275***  
   -0.162***  -0.744**  0.659***     -5.279   
CPI  DOLS    -0.342***  0.317***        -0.220*** 
  MGE  -0.142***  -0.164***  0.117***        -0.071** 
PPI     -0.252***  0.360***     0.349*** 
   -0.167***  -0.644***  0.036***     0.372***   29
equations, those will be used for which at least the error correction terms is significant and 
negative, and for which the productivity and net foreign asset variables are statistically 
significant with productivity having a negative sign. in which all estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and are correctly signed. From the panel equations, only the ones for the 
CPI-based real exchange rate are used. The retained equations are shaded in Tables 4 to 10. As 
real misalignments obtained from different equations may differ, the mean with the confidence 
intervals is useful for summarizing the pieces of information contained in each equation. This 
key measure of total real misalignments is displayed in Figure 6.  
A couple of issues attract attention here. Panel and time series results are broadly in line with 
each other in terms of broad movements. However, the precise size of the derived misalignments 
may be rather different between the time series and panel case. It can be observed that 
misalignments based on panel estimates may indicate prolonged periods of under- or 
overvaluations, while over- and undervaluations given by time series estimates cancel each other 
out over the period under study. This seems natural, given that the presence of cointegration 
implies for the time series case that the residuals, i.e. real misalignments, should be stationary. 
One reason for the conflicting results is the strong heterogeneity in the panel, which is also 
confirmed by the time series results. Thus, the size and the sign of the estimated coefficients 
reflect the sample average and not individual country behavior. Consequently, the derived 
misalignments should be viewed as a result of country heterogeneity and not as a consequence of 
the real exchange rate not matching the fundamentals. This is the reason why the real 
misalignments obtained using panel estimates will not be interpreted in the event that they are 
not in line with the time series misalignments. Another key difference between panel and time 
series data is this: Misalignments based on panel estimates are not necessarily based on the same 
set of equations as compared to that obtained from time series. For instance, the number of 
equations issued from the time series analysis is one for Romania. 
Let us now take a look at the derived total real misalignments. For Bulgaria, the time series 
results reveal that the Bulgarian lev was slightly overvalued just before the financial crisis 
occurred in 1996 and 1997. During and after the crisis, the currency became heavily 
undervalued, followed by a swift adjustment to equilibrium. Fairly valued toward the turn of the 
century, the Bulgarian real exchange rate appears to have been moving away from equilibrium in   30
the past two years and has become overvalued. For Croatia, the over- and undervaluation of the 
real exchange rate remained in a narrow corridor of roughly ±5% from 1994 to 2003. As far as 
Romania is concerned, the lei tends to be slightly overvalued by the end of the period. Regarding 
Russia, a substantial overvaluation prior to the 1998 crisis, followed by an undershooting 
reaching an undervaluation of roughly 20% in 1999, can be observed. Since then, the real 
exchange rate converged toward its equilibrium. In 2003, the ruble can be viewed as fairly 
valued or slightly overvalued. Similar to the ruble, the Ukrainian hryvnia appeared to be 
overvalued before the Russian crisis. The subsequent large adjustment resulted in an 
undervaluation, which was followed by a slow convergence toward equilibrium. For time series, 
individual results for the selected equations are depicted because the misalignments seem to form 
two classes. According to one class of measures, the hryvnia was considerably undervalued in 
2003, while the second group of misalignments suggests that undervaluation was corrected for 
by 2003. Turning now to Turkey, the results indicate that the real exchange rate was overvalued 
prior to 1993 and then became strongly undervalued. After a progressive rapprochement to 
equilibrium, the real exchange rate appears to have become increasingly overvalued in the 
crawling peg system. This overvaluation was sharply corrected for in 2001. Since mid-2002, the 
Turkish currency became increasingly overvalued once again.   31
 
Figure 8 Total Real Misalignments 
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         Note: Positive (negative) values denote an overvaluation (undervaluation). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the equilibrium exchange rate of two EU accession countries (Bulgaria 
and Romania), of two EU candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey) and of Russia and Ukraine. 
The analysis was carried out at three time horizons. We have shown that the currencies of these 
countries are largely undervalued in terms of absolute PPP. At the same time, some of them have 
undergone an appreciation implying a long-term convergence toward absolute PPP. Cross-
sectional regressions reported in the literature were employed to see whether the currencies are 
fairly valued in terms of relative productivity levels on the road to PPP. The results indicated an 
initial undervaluation for Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine, which were corrected for to s 
diverging extent by the mid-1990s. From the late 1990s onward, the real exchange rates in levels 
were broadly in line with relative productivity levels in Bulgaria, Croatia and Turkey, and 
slightly undervalued in Romania, Russia and  Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Romania. 
In a next step, we analyzed the extent to which the B-S effect and the D-D phenomenon may be 
driving the real exchange rate. It turned out that the basic hypotheses of the B-S effect are 
oftentimes violated in a number of countries. This implies that either productivity gains cannot 
translate into relative price increases or that this transmission is either amplified or attenuated. A 
simple accounting framework has revealed that, similarly to other CEECs, the B-S effect has a 
fairly moderate role in the countries under study. Furthermore, we have also shown how 
sensitive the results are to the use of data based on employment and employee data and to the 
classification of sectors into open and closed sectors. For Russia, it seems that some of the 
symptoms of the D-D phenomenon are present. 
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Finally, we studied short- to medium-term deviations of the real exchange rates from their 
equilibrium. For this purpose, the stock-flow approach to the real exchange rate was employed, 
which was extended with demand-side and other control variables. The estimates revealed some 
common features across countries. First, increases in productivity were found to cause the real 
exchange rate to appreciate, perhaps with the exception of Romania. This suggests that the scope 
for the mechanism described in NOEM models is not really at work in this set of countries. 
Second, net foreign assets usually entered the equation. Time series estimates also indicate a 
great deal of heterogeneity across countries. While positive for most countries, the sign on net 
foreign assets was negative in Croatia. This may imply that Croatia has already reached an 
accumulated net foreign liabilities position where it has to start servicing its debt, whereas the 
others are still on their way to the steady state. It should also be noted that the control variables 
(openness, government debt and public expenditures to GDP) turned out to be significant and 
correctly signed and not to alter results for productivity and net foreign assets across the six 
economies under study. The real oil price appears to have a different impact on the real exchange 
rate. We found limited evidence for an overwhelming role of oil prices and oil revenues in real 
exchange rate determination in Russia. 
When interpreting the time series results, it should be stressed, however, that they are not 
particularly robust, to say the least. For some countries, like Croatia and Russia, it is most 
difficult to establish the presence of cointegration. Whether cointegration is found and whether 
the coefficient estimates are statistically significant hinges oftentimes on the estimation 
technique and on the information criterion used for determining the lag structure and may also 
depend on the definition of the dummy variables aimed at capturing crisis periods. Contrary to 
the time series results, heterogeneous panel techniques yielded fairly significant and stable 
coefficient estimates for the panel composed of the six countries under study. 
The estimation results uncovered that panel and time series estimates can yield conflicting results 
regarding the deviations from equilibrium. Although the heterogeneous panel econometric 
estimates turned out to be very robust, they proved to do a poor job when deriving real 
misalignments simply because they reflect average behavior of a heterogeneous set of countries. 
We have argued that for such small heterogeneous panels, time series estimates should be used 
for the calculation of real misalignments. When using these figures, it should be borne in mind 
that they reflect rather short-term deviations from equilibrium. In fact, the size of the deviations   34
depends on how good real exchange rates can be modeled using fundamentals. Put in another 
way, the real exchange rate can be viewed as misaligned in the event the real exchange rate does 
not move in tandem with the underlying fundamentals. Our results have revealed that at the end 
of 2003, the Bulgarian lev, the Romanian lei and the Turkish lira became increasingly 
overvalued. At the same time, the real exchange rates in Croatia, Ukraine and probably also in 
Russia can be thought of as fairly valued.   35
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Data Appendix 
 
Annual Data 
Sectoral Value Added, Constant Prices 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Annual Database (via WIFO Database) 
Turkey: OECD National Accounts Database (via WIFO Database) 
Sectoral Empoyment/Employees 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Annual Database (via WIFO Database) 
Turkey: Türkiye Cumhyriet Merkez Bankasi (central bank) 
 
Monthly Data 
CPI, PPI 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey: CPI: IFS/IMF (TKI64..F), WPI: State Institute of Statistics, Turkey (TKPROPRCF) 
Euro area: Eurostat (EMCONPRCF, EMESPPIIF); U.S.A.: Bureau of Labor Statistics (USOCP009E), Main 
Economic Indicators, OECD (USOPP019F) 
Nominal Exchange Rate against the Euro and the U.S. Dollar 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey: Datastream (U.S. dollar: TKUSDSP, euro: TKEUROS, Deutsche mark: TKDEMSP) 
Industrial Production 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database; for Bulgaria and Ukraine, the index series were 
obtained using two series of industrial production (real, same month previous year=100 and previous month=100) 
Russia: Main Economic Indicators, OECD (Datastream, RSOPRX35G) 
Turkey (Manufacturing): State Institute of Statistics, Turkey(TKOPR038G) 
Euro area: Eurostat (Datastream, EMESINPRG) 
U.S.A.: Main Economic Indicators, OECD (Datastream, USOPR038F) 
Employment in Industry 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database 
Russia: IFS/IMF (Datastream, RSI67…F) 
Turkey: Türkiye Cumhyriet Merkez Bankasi (central bank) 
Euro area: Eurostat (Datastream, EMEBEMQ6%) 
U.S.A.: Bureau of Labor Statistics (Datastream: USEMPMAN) 
Current Account 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey: Main Economic Indicators, OECD (via Datastream, code: TKOBP$15B)   39
Data for Bulgaria (before 1996), Croatia, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine are linearly interpolated from quarterly to 
monthly frequency. 
Consolidated General (G) or Central (C) Government Balance 
Bulgaria (C), Croatia (C), Romania (C), Russia (C), Ukraine (G): wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey (G): Ministry of Finance, Turkey (via Datastream, code: TKGOVBALA) 
Consolidated General or Central Government Expenditures 
Bulgaria (C), Croatia (C), Romania (C), Russia (C), Ukraine (G): wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey: Ministry of Finance, Turkey (via Datastream, code: TKCBEXPNA) 
Monthly expenditures are added up for 12 months on a rolling basis. 
Exports and Imports 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: wiiw Monthly Database 
Turkey: OECD (via Datastream, TKOEXPU$A, TKOIMPU$A) 
Monthly exports and imports data are added up for 12 months on a rolling basis. 
Nominal GDP  
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine: European Intelligence Unit (via Datastream, codes: BLGDPD, 
CTGDPD, RMGDPD,RSGDGD, URGDPD) 
Turkey: Türkiye Cumhyriet Merkez Bankasi (central bank) 
Interpolated linearly from yearly to monthly frequency. 
Price of Crude Oil – Ural, U.S. Dollars 
Datastream (code: OILURAL(P)) 
Industrial Production – Crude Petroleum 
VOLN, Russia: Datastream (code: RSOPR005P)  
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